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Abstract
We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor
legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker’s
(J. Political Econ. 106 (1968) 172) ‘‘crime and punishment’’ framework into a corporate
ﬁnance environment of Jensen and Meckling (J. Financial Econ. 3 (1976) 305). We examine
the entrepreneur’s decision and the market equilibrium. The model is consistent with a number
of empirical regularities concerning the relation between investor protection and corporate
ﬁnance. It also sheds light on the patterns of capital ﬂows between rich and poor countries and
on the politics of reform of investor protection.
r 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Recent research reveals that a number of important differences in ﬁnancial
systems among countries are shaped by the extent of legal protection afforded
outside investors from expropriation by the controlling shareholders or managers.
The ﬁndings show that better legal protection of outside shareholders is associated
with: (1) more valuable stock markets (La Porta et al., 1997); (2) a higher number of
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PII: S030 4- 405X(02)00149-6listed ﬁrms (La Porta et al., 1997); (3) larger listed ﬁrms in terms of their sales or
assets (Kumar et al., 1999); (4) higher valuation of listed ﬁrms relative to their assets
(Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002); (5) greater dividend payouts (La Porta
et al., 2000a); (6) lower concentration of ownership and control (European
Corporate Governance Network, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al.,
2000); (7) lower private beneﬁts of control (Zingales, 1994; Nenova, 1999); and (8)
higher correlation between investment opportunities and actual investments
(Wurgler, 2000).
While the understanding of the empirical differences in the patterns of corporate
ﬁnance has advanced considerably, the theoretical work in this area is only
beginning. Anumber of studies explicitly model the expropriation of minority
shareholders by the controlling shareholders (see, among others, Grossman and
Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988; Hart, 1995; Burkart et al., 1997, 1998; Friedman
and Johnson, 2000) and the legal framework underlining such expropriation (La
Porta et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2000). Other studies attempt to explain
theoretically why control is so concentrated in countries with poor shareholder
protection (Zingales, 1995; La Porta et al., 1999; Bebchuk, 1999), and why such
organizational form as pyramids may be common (Wolfenzon, 1999). Still other
studies, such as Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000), argue that control structures with
multiple large shareholders may be efﬁcient in environments with poor shareholder
protection. La Porta et al. (2002) make the case for higher concentration of cash ﬂow
ownership (and not just control) in countries with poor shareholder protection. Each
of these studies has focused on speciﬁc aspects of legal environments with weak
shareholder protection. But a market equilibrium model of corporate ﬁnance in such
environments remains to be developed.
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In this paper we present one such model. The model incorporates elements of
Becker’s (1968) classic ‘‘crime and punishment’’ framework into a corporate ﬁnance
environment as in Jensen and Meckling (1976). We consider an entrepreneur trying
to raise equity ﬁnance for a project, and deciding how much equity to sell and how
big a project to undertake. We follow the literature (Zingales, 1995; Bebchuk, 1999)
in maintaining that the entrepreneur keeps control of the project after the initial
share offering. This entrepreneur operates in an environment with limited legal
protection of outside shareholders, and so has an opportunity to divert some of the
proﬁts of the ﬁrm once they materialize (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Burkart et al.,
1998). By doing so, he risks being sued and ﬁned for breaking the law or the
shareholder agreement. The quality of investor protection in our model is given by
the likelihood that the entrepreneur is caught and ﬁned for expropriating from
shareholders.
In this simple model, we show how the entrepreneur’s decisions on the size of the
project and the amount of cash ﬂow to sell are shaped by the legal environment. We
then embed this going-public decision into a market equilibrium with savers and
1One strand of the empirical literature not discussed in this paper deals with the implications of investor
protection for economic growth. On this, see Carlin and Mayer (1999), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1998), Levine and Zervos (1998), and Rajan and Zingales (1998).
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both the case of the worldwide capital market and that of segmented national
markets.
Under plausible conditions, this model generates a number of predictions. Firms
are larger, more valuable, and more plentiful, dividends are higher (and diversion of
proﬁts lower), ownership concentration is lower, and stock markets are more
developed in countries with better protection of shareholders. In fact, the simple
model delivers results corresponding to all eight ﬁndings summarized above.
We then go on to apply the model to ﬂows of funds between rich and poor
countries. The model explains why such ﬂows are limited, consistent with empirical
evidence discussed by Lucas (1990). The model also generates predictions about the
welfare effects of improvements in investor protection. In particular, it predicts that
entrepreneurs gain more (or lose less) from an improvement in investor protection
when the country is open to world capital ﬂows than when it is not. This result is
consistent with evidence that openness is correlated with ﬁnancial development
(Rajan and Zingales, 2001). Entrepreneurs are more likely to use their political
inﬂuence to improve investor protection when the country is open to capital ﬂows.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 describes the demand and supply of
funds. The equilibrium is described in Section 4. Section 5 presents an extension of
the model to analyze the magnitude of the capital ﬂows from rich to poor countries.
Section 6 analyzes the welfare effects from an improvement in investor protection.
Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2. The model
Consider a world with C countries, each one populated by J risk-neutral
entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur, Ej;c (entrepreneur j from country c), can develop a
project by setting up a ﬁrm. Entrepreneurs differ in their initial wealth, W
j;c
1 ; and in
the productivity of their projects, g j;c: Since the focus of the paper is on the effect of
investor protection, we assume that all countries have an identical pool of
entrepreneurs, i.e., for all j; and any two countries c1 and c2; W
j;c1
1 ¼ W
j;c2
1 and
g j;c1 ¼ g j;c2:
The model has two dates. At date 1, each entrepreneur chooses whether to set up a
ﬁrm. Firms have two sources of ﬁnance. First, from his date 1 wealth, each
entrepreneur, Ej;c; contributes R
j;c
E pW
j;c
1 to the ﬁrm. He invests his remaining
wealth in the market. Second, Ej;c raises R
j;c
M from the market by selling a fraction
xj;c of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow rights. We assume that entrepreneurs retain control of
their ﬁrms regardless of the fraction of the cash ﬂow rights they sell. Each ﬁrm uses
the funds committed to it to invest Ij;cpR
j;c
E þ R
j;c
M in the project, and the remaining
R
j;c
E þ R
j;c
M   Ij;c in the market.
The market interest rate for country c; ic; is determined by the supply and demand
for funds. The demand for funds is generated by the individual ﬁrms’ demand, and
the supply of funds is generated by entrepreneurs and ﬁrms’ supply. We consider two
cases. In the ﬁrst, there is perfect capital mobility and the world’s supply and demand
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mobility and each country’s interest rate is determined by its own demand and
supply schedules.
Revenue is realized at date 2. The production function exhibits constant returns to
scale: every dollar invested in the project generates 1 þ g j;c dollars. The date 2
revenue of the ﬁrm, Pj;c; is then given by
Pj;c ¼ð 1 þ g j;cÞIj;c þð 1 þ icÞðR
j;c
M þ R
j;c
E   I
j;c
MÞ: ð1Þ
The entrepreneur chooses the fraction dj;c of the revenue he diverts. We assume
that the levels of legal protection afforded to minority shareholders vary across
countries. Following Becker (1968), we assume that the entrepreneur is caught with
probability kcA½0;1 ; where the parameter kc is a measure of the legal protection of
investors in country c: Higher values of kc correspond to better investor protection.
An alternative assumption might be that ﬁrms in the same country but in different
industries are subject to different levels of investor protection. For example, the level
of investor protection could be higher for regulated ﬁrms. Adifferent assumption
might be that ownership structure affects the level of investor protection. Aﬁrm with
a second large shareholder could have a higher effective investor protection level,
since the other large shareholder’s monitoring increases the probability that the
entrepreneur is caught (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; La Porta et al., 1999;
Pagano and Roel, 1998). To keep the model simple, we assume that the level of
investor protection, kc; is the same for all ﬁrms in a country and does not depend on
the ownership structure.
If the entrepreneur is caught, he is forced to return the diverted amount to the ﬁrm
and, in addition, to pay a ﬁne of fðdj;cÞPj;c to the authorities.
2 In this case, the entire
revenue is distributed as dividends. However, if the entrepreneur is not caught, he
keeps the entire diverted amount, and the fraction of the revenue not diverted, ð1  
dj;cÞPj;c; is distributed as dividends. The entrepreneur’s payoff at date 2 is given by
kc½ð1   xj;cÞPj;c   fðdj;cÞPj;c þð 1   kcÞ½ð1   xj;cÞð1   dj;cÞPj;c þ dj;cPj;c 
þð 1 þ icÞðW
j;c
1   R
j;c
E Þ:
Rearranging this expression yields
ð1   xj;cÞð1  ð 1   kcÞdj;cÞPj;c þð 1   kcÞdj;cPj;c   kcfðdj;cÞPj;c
þð 1 þ icÞðW
j;c
1   R
j;c
E Þ: ð2Þ
Because the entrepreneur keeps the diverted amount with probability 1   kc;
ð1   kcÞdj;cPj;c is the expected diversion and ð1  ð 1   kcÞdj;cÞPj;c is the expected
dividend.
Finally, we make the following assumption.
2We assume that the ﬁne depends on the total amount diverted and not on the amount diverted from
minority shareholders. The entrepreneur diverts dP from the corporation – a separate legal person distinct
from the legal personalities of its shareholders. Most legal systems would consider the penalty based on the
damage done to the corporation, that is the full dP: This formulation also guarantees that the agency
problem is independent of the size of the project.
A. Shleifer, D. Wolfenzon / Journal of Financial Economics 66 (2002) 3–27 6Assumption. The function fð Þ satisﬁes
(a) fð0Þ¼0;
(b) f 0ð0Þ¼0;
(c) f 00ðdÞ > 0; and
(d) @½f 0ðdÞ=f 00ðdÞ =@d > 0:
No ﬁne is incurred when diversion is zero (assumption (a)), and the ﬁne is essentially
zero for the ﬁrst cent diverted (assumption (b)). Assumption (c) implies that the
marginal ﬁne increases with the amount diverted. Assumption (d) sets a bound on the
speed at which f 00ðdÞ increases. That is, we allow f 00ðdÞ to be decreasing, constant, or
even increasing, as long as it does not increase too fast.
3 In particular, this assumption
eliminates the ‘‘boil them in oil’’ results, in which expropriation is precluded entirely
with sufﬁciently heavy penalties even when the probability of detection is low.
Extremely heavy civil penalties are uncommon in most countries for many reasons,
including fairness, wealth constraints, the possibility of false convictions, and the risk
of subversion of justice by powerful defendants facing exorbitant ﬁnes.
3. The demand and supply of funds
In this section we take the interest rate ic as given and analyze the choices of an
entrepreneur. From the individual choices, we derive the aggregate demand and
supply schedules for each level of interest rate ic:
We show that entrepreneurs with productivity of projects below ic do not set up
ﬁrms and instead supply their entire wealth to the market. For any interest rate, ic; the
aggregate supply of funds is then the aggregate wealth of entrepreneurs with g j;coic:
We also show that entrepreneurs who do not supply their wealth to the market (i.e.,
those with g j;cXic) invest their entire wealth in their ﬁrms and demand additional
funds from the market. The aggregate demand for funds is the sum of their individual
demands, and measures the desired level of external ﬁnance for a given ic: We show
that, with better investor protection, the desired level of external ﬁnance is higher at
each ic: At the equilibrium interest rate (discussed in the following section), the
desired level of external ﬁnance and the supply of funds are equalized.
We start solving the model at date 2. To lighten notation, we suppress the
superscripts in all variables. At date 2, E chooses the level of diversion to maximize
his payoff:
maxdfð1   xÞð1  ð 1   kÞdÞþð 1   kÞd   kfðdÞgP þð 1 þ iÞðW1   REÞ:
3The results of the model hold if the ﬁne fðd;kÞ and the probability of detection pðd;kÞ depend on both
the amount diverted and the level of investor protection. In fact, we could have a more general model in
which the entrepreneur diverts dP of the ﬁrm and receives private beneﬁts of ðd   cðd;kÞÞP; where cðd;kÞ
is the cost of diversion. If cðd;kÞ¼gðkÞfðdÞ; and g0ðkÞ > 0 (better investor protection implies higher cost of
diversion), we obtain all the results under assumptions (a)–(d). There is no loss of generality in using this
simpliﬁed setting.
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kf 0ðd
nÞ¼ð 1   kÞx: ð3Þ
Assumption (c) guarantees that the second-order conditions for a maximum are
satisﬁed. From the viewpoint of the entrepreneur, the left-hand side of Eq. (3) is the
marginal cost of diverting, or the marginal increase in the expected ﬁne. For the next
dollar diverted, the ﬁne increases by f 0ðdÞ and he pays this ﬁne with probability k:
The right-hand side is the marginal beneﬁt of diverting, or the marginal increase in
expected dividend savings. By diverting an extra dollar, the entrepreneur avoids
paying a fraction x of it to outside shareholders, although he keeps this dollar only
with probability 1   k:
Proposition 1. Suppose that assumptions (a)–(c) hold. The solution to Eq. (3), dnðx;kÞ;
satisﬁes
(a) dnð0;kÞ¼0;
(b) dn
1ðx;kÞ > 0; and
(c) dn
2ðx;kÞo0:
The subscripts 1 and 2 denote the derivatives with respect to the ﬁrst and second
argument, respectively.
Part (a) of Proposition 1 follows because, for x ¼ 0; E gets the entire dividend and,
therefore, he has no reason to divert and possibly pay a ﬁne. Part (b) follows because
the higher the fraction of the cash ﬂow rights in the hands of outside shareholders,
the higher is the fraction of the next dollar diverted that E avoids paying to them.
That is, the marginal beneﬁt of diverting is higher. Part (b) is the well-known
Jensen and Meckling (1976) result that higher ownership concentration leads to
more efﬁcient actions. Burkart et al. (1998) and La Porta et al. (2002) derive
similar results. Finally, part (c) follows because better investor protection (higher k)
implies that diversion is more costly (the entrepreneur pays the ﬁne more often)
and less beneﬁcial (the entrepreneur keeps the diverted amount less often).
Expected diversion, ð1   kÞdnP; is also lower in environments with better investor
protection. This is because diversion itself is lower (part (c)) and, in addition,
the entrepreneur is forced to return the diverted amount to the ﬁrm more
often.
Below, we show that the ﬁrm invests in the project the entire amount committed to
it. This implies that, in this model, Tobin’s Q is given by ð1   dnð1   kÞÞð1 þ gÞ: In
addition, expected dividends divided by investment are given by ð1   dnð1   kÞÞ
ð1 þ gÞ, and divided by pre-expropriation cash ﬂow by ð1   dnð1   kÞÞ: Similarly,
expected private beneﬁts divided by investment are given by dnð1   kÞð1 þ gÞ; and
divided by pre-theft cash ﬂow by dnð1   kÞ: The next result follows.
Corollary 1. Controlling for ownership concentration and growth opportunities,
Tobin’s Q and dividends are higher and private beneﬁts lower in countries with better
investor protection.
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and La Porta et al. (2002) for Tobin’s Q, La Porta et al. (2000a, b) for
dividends, and Nenova (1999) for private beneﬁts – ﬁndings (4), (5), and (7) of the
introduction.
The sensitivity of diversion to ownership concentration, dn
1; plays an important
role in the analysis. From assumption (d), it follows that dn
1 does not decrease too
fast. For the purposes of explaining the intuition of some of the results, however, we
will say that dn
1 is ‘‘relatively’’ constant. We explain in the appendix how this
property guarantees a well-behaved maximization problem at date 1. Here we
explain how this property guarantees that dn
1 is lower in countries with better
investor protection.
Proposition 2. If assumptions (a)–(d) hold, then dn
12ðx;kÞo0: The effect of a change in
ownership concentration on the level of diversion is smaller in countries with better
investor protection.
By Proposition 1, for two different levels of investor protection kH > kL; diversion
is zero at x ¼ 0; and is lower for kH at all x > 0: This is shown in the following ﬁgure:
Proposition 2 states that, at any x; in addition to being below curve kL; curve kH
has a lower slope. Unlike Proposition 1, the proof of Proposition 2 requires
assumption (d). Even without assumption (d), however, Proposition 2 must usually
hold; otherwise, it would be impossible for curve kH to be always below curve kL: In
other words, even though we cannot derive Proposition 2 from assumptions (a)–(c),
we can guarantee with these three assumptions that ‘‘on average’’ the slope of curve
kH is smaller than that of curve kL: If, in addition, the slopes are relatively constant
(as assumption (d) guarantees) then the slope of curve kH is always smaller than that
of curve kL:
Proposition 2 predicts that, controlling for growth opportunities (g in this model),
Tobin’s Q, dividends, and private beneﬁts are more sensitive to ownership
concentration in countries with poor investor protection. La Porta et al. (2002)
ﬁnd support for the lower sensitivity of Tobin’s Q to ownership concentration in
countries with poor investor protection. We are not aware of similar evidence for
dividends or private beneﬁts.
At date 1, E chooses the size of the project, I; the amount of funds he contributes
to the ﬁrm, RE; and the fraction of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows he sells, x; by solving the
d
x
k
H
kL
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maxI;RE;xfð1   xÞð1  ð 1   kÞd
nÞþð 1   kÞd
n   kfðd
nÞgP þð 1 þ iÞðW1   REÞ
such that
REpW1; ð4Þ
and
IpRE þ RM:
Letting rðx;kÞ¼xð1  ð 1   kÞdnðx;kÞÞ be the fraction of the total revenue that
outside shareholders expect to receive, RM can be written as
RM ¼
rðx;kÞ
1 þ i
P:
If the solution to the above problem is not to invest in the project ðIn ¼ 0Þ and not
to raise funds ðRn
M ¼ 0Þ; we say that the ﬁrm is not set up.
Proposition 3. At the solution to the entrepreneur’s problem, the following hold
(a) If goi; the ﬁrm is not set up.
(b) If g ¼ i; the entrepreneur is indifferent between (1) not setting up the ﬁrm and (2)
setting up the ﬁrm with no outside shareholders ðxn ¼ 0Þ and investing any fraction
of his wealth in the project.
(c) If g > i; the ﬁrm is set up and the solution can be of two types:
(1) If maxx rðx;kÞð1 þ gÞ=ð1 þ iÞX1; the optimal xn is any of the (potentially
many) x that satisfy rðxn;kÞð1 þ gÞ=ð1 þ iÞX1; and In ¼þ N:
(2) If maxx rðx;kÞð1 þ gÞ=ð1 þ iÞo1; the entrepreneur invests all his wealth in the
project and sets Rn
E þ Rn
M ¼ In: The optimal xn satisﬁes
@
@x
½kfðd
nðx
n;kÞÞ  ¼ r1ðx;kÞ
1þg
1þi   1   kfðdnðxn;kÞÞ
1þg
1þi
1   rðxn;kÞ
1þg
1þi
; ð5Þ
and In ¼ W1=ð1   rðxn;kÞð1 þ gÞ=ð1 þ iÞÞ:
When goi; the entrepreneur does not invest in the project since the market yields a
higher rate of return. In addition, he does not raise funds from the market. At ﬁrst, it
seems that raising funds from the market, reinvesting them in the market, and then
diverting a fraction of them is a beneﬁcial action for the entrepreneur. However, with
rational investors, an entrepreneur who raises funds pays for these funds in full and
also incurs an additional cost due to the expected ﬁne he pays. It is only beneﬁcial to
raise funds when they can be invested at a higher rate than they cost.
When g ¼ i; the entrepreneur is indifferent between investing in the project or in
the market and, as explained above, it is not beneﬁcial for him to raise funds.
When g > i; it pays to raise funds from the market to invest them at this higher
rate. The entrepreneur invests all his wealth and all the funds raised in the project
since it yields a higher return than the market ðRn
E þ Rn
M ¼ InÞ:
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(c)(1) of Proposition 3 there is an x for which this expression is larger than one. The
entrepreneur sets x to such a value and raises more than one dollar per dollar
invested. This allows him to invest any amount he wants. To maximize his wealth, he
sets I ¼þ N and demands an inﬁnite amount of funds. Obviously, the equilibrium
never lies in this region. The interest rate rises to equate demand and supply.
However, when for all x; rðx;kÞ½ð1 þ gÞ=ð1 þ iÞ  is less than one as in case (c)(2), the
entrepreneur has to contribute a fraction of each dollar invested from his wealth.
Therefore, the size of the project is limited by his personal wealth. Using the fact that
Rn
E þ Rn
M ¼ In; the objective function in Eq. (4) can be rewritten as
maxx;I
1 þ g
1 þ i
  1   kfðd
nðx;kÞÞ
1 þ g
1 þ i
  
I þ W1: ð6Þ
The expression ½ð1 þ gÞ=ð1 þ iÞ    1 is the NPV per dollar invested. Since investors
demand the market interest rate i; the entrepreneur receives the entire NPV that the
project generates. In addition, the entrepreneur pays the expected ﬁne. The expression
kfðdnÞ½ð1 þ gÞ=ð1 þ iÞ  is the present value of the expected ﬁne per dollar invested. The
entrepreneur faces the following tradeoff when choosing x: Ahigher x leads to higher
diversion and, therefore, a higher ﬁne, but also allows E to raise more funds and
expand the size of the project. At the solution (Eq. (5)), the entrepreneur equates the
marginal cost (left-hand side) with the marginal beneﬁt (right-hand side). We explain
in the appendix that assumption (d) guarantees a maximum for this problem.
The demand and supply of funds are derived directly from Proposition 3. Firm
demand is downward sloping in the interest rate i: For a sufﬁciently large ið> gÞ; the
ﬁrm is not set up and therefore demand is zero. For intermediate values of i; the ﬁrm
is set up and its demand for funds is given by RM ¼½ rðxn;kÞ=ð1 þ iÞ ð1 þ gÞIn: Over
this range, as i decreases, demand increases. Finally, for i sufﬁciently low, the
demand for funds is inﬁnite. Since an individual ﬁrm’s demand is downward sloping,
so is aggregate demand.
The supply of funds from an entrepreneur is as follows. If the interest rate is higher
than the productivity of his project ði > gÞ; the entrepreneur does not set up a ﬁrm
and supplies his entire wealth to the market. If, however, the interest rate is below his
project’s productivity ðiogÞ; the entrepreneur invests his entire wealth in the project
and does not supply funds to the market. In the case where i ¼ g; the entrepreneur is
indifferent between supplying any fraction of his wealth to the market and investing
the rest in a wholly owned ﬁrm. Note that investor protection does not affect the
supply of funds. Finally, the aggregate supply of funds is upward sloping. As the
interest rate rises, more entrepreneurs ﬁnd it proﬁtable to supply their wealth to the
market rather than setting up their own ﬁrms.
4. Equilibrium
We consider two cases. In Section 4.1, we assume perfect capital mobility across
countries, and in Section 4.2 we assume no capital mobility.
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With perfect capital mobility, the world interest rate in equates the world demand
and supply for funds
X
cAC
X
jAJ
R
j;c
M ¼
X
cAC
X
jAJ
ðW
j;c
1   R
j;c
E Þ:
It can be shown that an equilibrium interest rate exists. At in; no entrepreneur will
be in case (c)(1) of Proposition 3 because, in that case, the demand for funds is
inﬁnite.
Proposition 4. Consider two countries H and L that differ in the level of investor
protection, with kH > kL: Country H will have
(a) lower ownership concentration (for all j;x*j;H > x*j;L),
(b) larger external capital markets
P
j R*j;H
M >
P
j R*j;L
M
  
; and
(c) larger ﬁrms (for all j;I *j;H > I *j;L).
These results correspond to ﬁndings (6), (1), and (3) from the introduction. Part
(a) of Proposition 4 follows from the ﬁrst-order condition in Eq. (5). This expression
equates the marginal cost (left-hand side) and the marginal beneﬁt (right-hand side)
of selling an additional fraction of the cash ﬂow rights (increasing x). The result that
xn increases with investor protection follows because an increase in investor
protection causes the marginal cost schedule to shift down and the marginal beneﬁt
schedule to shift up.
The marginal cost is the increase in the expected ﬁne. It shifts down when investor
protection increases because, with better investor protection, an increase in x
translates into a smaller increase in dn (Proposition 2), and consequently into a
smaller increase in the expected ﬁne.
The marginal beneﬁt is the additional payoff obtained from investing the
additional funds raised at a rate that is higher than the market rate. It shifts up when
investor protection increases because more funds are raised by an increase in x and
the return on these funds is higher. An increase in x has two effects on the amount
raised: it increases the fraction of cash ﬂow rights sold (quantity effect), but it
reduces share prices (price effect) due to the increase in diversion. In countries with
better investor protection, the effect of x on diversion is lower, and hence the price
reaction is smaller. Thus, more funds are raised. The numerator of the fraction that
appears on the right-hand side of Eq. (5) is the return the entrepreneur receives for
each dollar invested. We show in the appendix (see Lemma A.1) and discuss in
Section 6 that this return is higher in countries with better investor protection.
Part (a) of Proposition 4 is consistent with previous empirical literature, such as La
Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000).
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better investor protection, ﬁrms sell more shares. But the size of the capital market is
measured in dollars. Since lower concentration leads to lower prices, it is not a priori
clear that countries with better investor protection have larger capital markets. The
intuition for the result is as follows. As explained above, an increase in x has two
opposite effects on the amount raised: a quantity effect and a price effect. At the
solution, it must be the case that the quantity effect dominates the price effect (i.e.,
the solution is in a region where the amount raised increases with x). If this were not
the case, E could increase his payoff by reducing x; because by doing so he would
reduce the ﬁne and also increase the amount raised. Ahigher equilibrium x
therefore implies larger capital markets. This result is consistent with La Porta et al.
(1997).
Part (c) of Proposition 4 follows directly from the previous result. E invests the
sum of his own funds plus the amount he raises. The more he raises, the more he
invests. This result is consistent with the ﬁndings of Kumar et al. (1999).
We now analyze the number of ﬁrms going public. In this model, an
entrepreneur goes public (i.e., sells shares) as long as the return on assets, g; is
larger than the interest rate, i: The reason is that no matter how poorly
minority shareholders are protected, the costs due to diversion are initially very
small and it always pays to sell at least a small fraction of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows.
However, the situation changes if there is a small cost of going public, c; that the ﬁrm
incurs. This cost can be interpreted as the listing costs, such as investment banking
fees.
Proposition 5. More ﬁrms go public in countries with better investor protection.
Because the beneﬁt of going public is larger in countries with better investor
protection, there are more projects in such countries for which it is proﬁtable to pay
the cost to go public. This result is consistent with the evidence in La Porta et al.
(1997) – ﬁnding (2) in the introduction.
This result reinforces those of Proposition 4. As a consequence of the direct cost of
going public, some ﬁrms in countries with poor investor protection, which would have
gone public absent this cost, stay private. They remain wholly owned by the
entrepreneur and do not raise funds. The variation among countries in ownership
concentration and the size of the capital market is larger with this cost than
without it.
Finally, we analyze Tobin’s Q, dividends, and private beneﬁts of control
under different levels of investor protection. In Corollary 1 we found that,
controlling for ownership concentration, Tobin’s Q and dividends are higher and
private beneﬁts lower in countries with better investor protection. This result is
driven by the fact that, controlling for ownership, expected diversion is higher in
countries with inferior investor protection (recall that Tobin’s Q and dividends
divided by investment are both given by ð1  ð 1   kÞdnÞð1 þ gÞ and private beneﬁts
by ð1   kÞdnð1 þ gÞ). Without controlling for ownership, the result is not as
straightforward.
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2ðx
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:
An increase in investor protection implies that the entrepreneur keeps the
diverted amount less often, thereby reducing expected diversion. This effect is
captured by the ﬁrst term. The rest of the expression represents the change in actual
diversion. Recall that an increase in investor protection reduces ownership
concentration. The second term represents the increase in diversion due to the
decline in ownership concentration. Finally, an increase in investor protection
discourages diversion, per part (c) of Proposition 1, and this effect is captured by the
third term.
The ﬁrst effect, the reduction in the probability of keeping the diverted amount,
clearly reduces expected diversion. Therefore, a sufﬁcient condition for the total
effect to be negative is that actual diversion be decreasing in k: The following
proposition lays out this sufﬁcient condition.
Proposition 6. If @½ð1   kÞxn=k =@k > 0 then @½ð1   kÞdnðxn;kÞ =@ko0: That is,
equilibrium diversion decreases as the level of investor protection rises.
The condition implies that the equilibrium level of x changes slowly with investor
protection. When this is the case, the increase in diversion due to the decline in
ownership concentration is small compared to the decrease in diversion due to the
disincentive effect of investor protection.
When Proposition 6 holds, countries with better investor protection have higher
Tobin’s Q, higher dividends, and lower private beneﬁts of control, even though they
have lower ownership concentration. These results correspond to ﬁndings (4), (5),
and (7) of the introduction.
The condition in Proposition 6 is needed to ensure that the expected diversion
monotonically decreases with the level of investor protection. However, without this
condition, it is possible to show that for sufﬁciently high levels of investor
protection, diversion is low. At the extreme, when k ¼ 1; the entrepreneur never
keeps the diverted amount since he is always caught and pays the ﬁne. He therefore
does not divert regardless of the ownership structure. Thus, close to k ¼ 1 diversion
is low.
4.2. No capital mobility
In this case, each country has its interest rate determined by its own supply and
demand of funds. That is, for country c; the interest rate, ic; is given by
X
jAJ
R
j;c
M ¼
X
jAJ
ðW
j;c
1   R
j;c
E Þ:
The following result can be established.
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country with better investor protection has a higher market interest rate.
The supply schedules in these two countries are the same (see Section 3). For any
given interest rate, i; all the entrepreneurs with productivity of projects below the
interest rate ðgoiÞ supply their funds to the market. This is true regardless of the
level of investor protection.
The demand for external funds depends on the level of investor protection. All
entrepreneurs with productivity of projects above the interest rate i ðg > iÞ set up
projects. They invest their own wealth in the project and demand additional funds
from the market. For a given interest rate, i; this additional demand is higher in
countries with better investor protection. As a result, the interest rate is higher and
the size of the external equity market is larger in countries with good investor
protection.
Compared to the results derived for the case of perfect capital mobility, capital
markets with no mobility are again larger and there is also more investment in
countries with better investor protection, but the difference is smaller due to the
effect of a higher interest rate. Also, ownership concentration is lower in countries
with better investor protection, provided the supply of funds is not too steep. If the
condition of Proposition 6 holds, then the results regarding the level of diversion,
Tobin’s Q, and dividends also hold in this setting. However, with closed capital
markets, more ﬁrms go public in countries with good investor protection only when
the cost of going public, c; is large.
Regardless of the level of investor protection, the entire wealth of the economy is
invested at date 1 since there is no consumption at that date. However, in countries
with better investor protection, a larger fraction of the invested capital comes from
the external market and a smaller fraction from internal funds (the funds of the
entrepreneurs setting up ﬁrms). To see this, suppose that the equilibrium interest rate
in a country with poor investor protection is i: At this interest rate, there would be
excess demand for funds in the country with better investor protection since, as
explained above, the supply of external funds would be the same but the demand for
external funds higher. To reach an equilibrium, the interest rate must increase. This
increase raises the number of entrepreneurs supplying their funds to the market
(hence larger external markets) and reduces the number of ﬁrms demanding funds
(hence less use of internal funds).
An interesting corollary of Proposition 7 is the following.
Corollary 2. In countries with better investor protection, not only are more funds raised
by ﬁrms, but these funds are also channeled to higher-productivity projects.
This result is consistent with the empirical results of Wurgler (2000) and
corresponds to ﬁnding (8) of the introduction. This result holds since better investor
protection leads high-productivity ﬁrms to demand more funds. The increased
demand raises the country’s interest rate. As a result, entrepreneurs with moderately
productive projects supply their funds to the market in countries with good investor
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a consequence, in countries with good investor protection, funds concentrate in the
high-productivity projects. This result does not hold in the case of perfect capital
mobility since in that case the interest rate is independent of investor protection.
However, the introduction of a moderate restriction on capital ﬂows restores the result.
5. Why doesn’t capital ﬂow to developing countries?
One of the great puzzles in modern economics is why capital fails to ﬂow from rich
to poor countries (Lucas, 1990).
4 Using a standard production technology, Lucas
calculates that the implied marginal product of capital in India is 58 times that of the
U.S. This result follows from the assumption of decreasing returns to scale and the
fact that the U.S. has more capital. Lucas proposes three solutions to this puzzle:
differences in human capital, external beneﬁts of human capital, and capital market
imperfections.
Proposition 7 suggests another possible explanation of the Lucas puzzle: better
investor protection leading to higher interest rates and eliminating the incentive for
capital to ﬂow to a country with worse investor protection. In our model, total
output is determined by the production technology and by agency costs (the waste or
ﬁnes resulting from diversion). Even though ﬁrms in different countries have access
to the same production technology, they differ in the severity of agency costs. In
countries with better investor protection, the agency problem is less severe, so the
effective production technology (net of agency costs) is more efﬁcient. Countries with
better investor protection then have a higher marginal product of capital and
consequently higher interest rates.
But Proposition 7 is about countries with better investor protection, not richer
countries. Since higher levels of wealth and capital might exert downward pressure
on interest rates, the conclusion of Proposition 7 might not hold for richer countries.
We show below, however, that even with the assumption that richer countries have
better investor protection, it is still the case that they generally have higher interest
rates.
We consider two countries, H and L; with kH > kL: Whereas we assumed before
that entrepreneurs with similar projects in different countries had the same wealth
level, we now assume that entrepreneurs in the country with good investor protection
H are richer. That is, we assume that g j;H ¼ g j;L and Wj;H ¼ NWj;L; with N > 1:
We solve for the case of no capital mobility. If the interest rate in the rich, good-
investor-protection country is lower than that in the poor, bad-investor-protection
country, then we expect capital to ﬂow from the rich to the poor country. However,
we ﬁnd that, in this model, the equilibrium interest rate is not affected by the level of
wealth in the economy.
4Henry (2000) ﬁnds a temporary increase in investment following a capital account liberalization. This
ﬂow, however, is small relative to the magnitude of the Lucas puzzle.
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independent of the level of wealth in the economy, N:
The marginal product of capital (interest rate) is affected by the severity of the
agency problem. On the one hand, this problem is more severe in rich countries since,
in equilibrium, more external funds need to be raised. On the other hand, the severity
of the agency problem is mitigated in rich countries because richer entrepreneurs can
afford to retain a larger fraction of the ﬁrm. These two effects cancel out as
Proposition 8 indicates.
Since the equilibrium interest rate is independent of total wealth (i.e., N), only
investor protection affects interest rates in this model. By Proposition 7, the interest
rate is higher in the country with better investor protection. This theory, then, takes
a further step toward explaining the Lucas puzzle of why capital does not ﬂow
from rich to poor countries: too much of it is expropriated by entrepreneurs in the
latter.
6. Who gains and who loses from an improvement in investor protection?
Why don’t the countries suffering from ﬁnancial underdevelopment improve their
levels of investor protection? Recent research suggests that political opposition to
reform from incumbent entrepreneurs is an important part of the answer (Bebchuk
and Roe, 1999; La Porta et al., 2000b; Hellwig, 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 2001). In
addition, Rajan and Zingales (2001) show that open economies are more likely to
undertake reforms beneﬁting ﬁnancial development. Our model enables us to
examine who gains and who loses from improvements in investor protection. It
therefore sheds light on both the question of opposition to reform and the
dependence of such opposition on openness.
If we focus attention on ﬁrms that have been already set up, it is clear that
entrepreneurs that set up ﬁrms lose and investors (i.e., those entrepreneurs who do
not set up ﬁrms but instead invest in the market) gain from an improvement in
investor protection. The reason is that the price paid by investors for a ﬁrm’s shares
incorporates expectations of high diversion by the entrepreneur. When investor
protection is unexpectedly improved, the entrepreneur diverts less and loses as a
result. Investors gain since lower diversion implies higher dividends.
But do entrepreneurs lose more in countries that are open or in countries that
restrict capital ﬂows? To answer this question, we focus on a country that initially
has poor investor protection (relative to the world average), but unexpectedly
improves it after the ﬁrms in the country have been set up. We compare the losses of
entrepreneurs and the gains to investors from this improvement under the alternative
assumptions about openness.
Proposition 9. Consider a small country (sufﬁciently small to have no effect on the
world interest rate) with a low level of investor protection, which unexpectedly improves
the level of investor protection after its ﬁrms have been set up. In a country initially
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country that initially restricts capital ﬂows.
To understand the intuition for the welfare effect on entrepreneurs, we ﬁrst need
to analyze the ownership choices and the amount of diversion under perfect capital
mobility and no capital mobility. The country has a lower interest rate when it
restricts capital ﬂows than when it does not. This is because, as we showed in
Proposition 7, poor investor protection puts downward pressure on the interest rate
in a closed economy. In contrast, when the country is open to world capital ﬂows, it
has the world interest rate, which is higher. Alower interest rate implies that
ownership is less concentrated (i.e., x is higher) because entrepreneurs sell more
shares as investors demand a lower return. In sum, ﬁrms in a country that is closed to
capital ﬂows have lower ownership concentration and consequently higher diversion.
An improvement in investor protection has two effects on the entrepreneur’s
payoff. An increase in the probability of being caught has a direct effect on his
payoff since the entrepreneur keeps the diverted amount less often and pays the ﬁne
more often. The entrepreneur therefore suffers more in situations where he was
initially diverting more (he is forced to return a larger amount and in addition he is
more likely to pay a higher ﬁne). There is also an indirect effect on the entrepreneur’s
payoff since an improvement in investor protection reduces the level of diversion.
However, by the envelope theorem this effect is small since the entrepreneur chooses
diversion optimally at date 2. Overall, entrepreneurs suffer more when the country is
initially closed to capital ﬂows since, as we explained above, diversion is higher in
that scenario.
In Proposition 9, we assume that ﬁrms have already been set up. We can also look
at this issue from the perspective of entrepreneurs about to set up ﬁrms. After all,
even existing entrepreneurs often need new capital for new projects. To focus on this
issue, we consider the consequences of an improvement in investor protection before
ﬁrms are set up.
Proposition 10. Suppose investor protection is improved before any ﬁrm is set up.
(a) In the case of perfect capital mobility, all the entrepreneurs setting up ﬁrms are
strictly better off.
(b) In the case of no capital mobility, there is a group of entrepreneurs (those with
marginally proﬁtable projects) who are made worse off.
In the case of perfect capital mobility, the improvement in investor protection does
not affect the interest rate. This implies that the same group of ﬁrms is set up.
Entrepreneurs who set up their ﬁrms beneﬁt because they raise more funds and pay
lower ﬁnes.
Entrepreneurs raise more funds because investors anticipate less diversion and so
are willing to pay higher prices for the shares. The fact that entrepreneurs pay lower
ﬁnes is not a priori clear. On the one hand, an improvement in investor protection
increases the expected ﬁne since entrepreneurs are more likely to be caught (direct
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consequently pay a smaller ﬁne when caught. To understand why the expected ﬁne
is smaller in countries with better investor protection, compare the increase in the
expected ﬁne – not the total expected ﬁne – as more shares are sold, @½kfðdnÞ =@x:
This increase is given by kf 0ðdnÞ dn
1 – the marginal cost of diverting times the
increase in diversion. The increase in diversion is higher in countries with poor
investor protection, since by Proposition 2, dn
12o0: In addition, the marginal cost of
diverting is also higher in countries with poor investor protection since, at date 2, the
entrepreneur equates kf 0ðdÞ with ð1   kÞx and this last expression is higher for
smaller k: Since @½kfðdnÞ =@x is higher in countries with poor investor protection at
all levels of ownership concentration, the total expected ﬁne, kfðdnÞ; is higher as well.
The situation is different when the country is closed to world capital ﬂows. In this
case, in addition to the effects discussed above, the equilibrium interest rate increases
(Proposition 7). As a result, entrepreneurs with marginally proﬁtable projects
who were taking advantage of the low interest rate are no longer able to set up their
ﬁrms.
The welfare effects of an improvement in investor protection cannot be analyzed
in a partial equilibrium setting since the behavior of the equilibrium interest rate is
crucial for the analysis. The conclusion of Propositions 9 and 10 is that entrepreneurs
are more strongly opposed to an improvement of investor protection when the
country restricts the ﬂows of capital. These propositions predict that capital market
openness is more likely to politically accommodate improvements in investor
protection and capital market development, consistent with the recent evidence of
Rajan and Zingales (2001).
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we present a very basic model of an entrepreneur going public in an
environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. We examine this
entrepreneur’s decisions and the market equilibrium. The model clariﬁes a number of
assumptions needed to obtain empirically valid predictions on corporate ownership
patterns, dividend policies, ﬁrm valuation, and ﬁnancial development in the regimes
of poor investor protection. Under these assumptions, the model is consistent with
the basic empirical regularities concerning the relation between investor protection
and corporate ﬁnance. In addition, the model makes a number of general
equilibrium predictions concerning the patterns of capital ﬂows among countries,
as well as the politics of corporate governance reform. These predictions appear to
be consistent with recently developed empirical evidence.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Part (a) follows because by assumption (b), f 0ð0Þ¼0:
Part (b) follows by completely differentiating Eq. (3) with respect to x to obtain
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1ðx;kÞ¼ 1
½k=ð1 kÞ  f 00ðdnÞ > 0: Similarly, part (c) follows by completely differentiating
Eq. (3) with respect to k to obtain dn
2ðx;kÞ¼  ½ x=k2f 00ðdnÞ o0: &
Proof of Proposition 2.
d
n
12 ¼
 1
k2f 00ðdÞ
1  
f 000ðdÞf 0ðdÞ
ðf 00ðdÞÞ
2
  
:
Note that
@
@d
f 0ðdÞ
f 00ðdÞ
  
¼ 1  
f 000ðdÞf 0ðdÞ
ðf 00ðdÞÞ
2 > 0 ðby assumption ðdÞÞ:
Therefore dn
12o0: &
Proof of Proposition 3. We ﬁrst solve for P and RM (note that, in the text, each is
deﬁned as a function of the other) to obtain
P ¼
ðg   iÞI þð 1 þ iÞRE
1   rðx;kÞ
;
and
RM ¼
rðx;kÞ
1 þ i
 
ðg   iÞI þð 1 þ iÞRE
1   rðx;kÞ
:
Using these expressions, the entrepreneur’s problem in Eq. (4) can be written as
maxI;RE;xf1   rðx;kÞ kfðd
nÞg
ðg   iÞI þð 1 þ iÞRE
1   rðx;kÞ
þð 1 þ iÞðW1   REÞð A:1Þ
subject to
REpW1; ðA:2Þ
and
REXI 1   rðx;kÞ
1 þ g
1 þ i
  
; ðA:3Þ
where the last inequality is equivalent to RE þ RMXI:
First, consider the case where goi: Since g   io0; the objective function is
decreasing in I: Since (A.3) is satisﬁed for In ¼ 0; it is optimal to set In ¼ 0: Now, if
xn ¼ 0; then Rn
M ¼ 0: So suppose xn > 0: This implies that kfðdnÞ > 0 and hence
ð1   r   kfÞ=ð1   rÞo1: Therefore setting Rn
E ¼ 0 maximizes the objective function.
In addition, both (A.2) and (A.3) are satisﬁed for Rn
E ¼ 0 and In ¼ 0: Finally, for
these values, Rn
M ¼ 0:
Second, consider the case where g ¼ i: If x ¼ 0; the objective function reduces to
ð1 þ iÞW1; and RM ¼ 0: In this case RE and I can be set to any value that satisﬁes the
constraint. If, however, x > 0; then ½ð1   r   kfÞ=ð1   rÞ o1 and therefore RE ¼ 0
maximizes the objective function. Since I does not affect the objective function, it
can be set to any value that satisﬁes (A.3); in this case, the only possible value is
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that RM ¼ 0:
Finally, consider the case where g > i: In this case, the objective function is
increasing in I: Therefore, in subcase (1), xn is such that rðxn;kÞ½ð1 þ gÞ=ð1 þ iÞ X1
and In ¼þ N: For these values, the constraints are satisﬁed and the objective
function is maximized.
Consider subcase (2). We show that both constraints bind. First, suppose that, at
the solution, Rn
E > In½1   rðxn;kÞ½ð1 þ gÞ=ð1 þ iÞ  . Since the constraint is not binding,
I can be increased, thereby increasing the objective function (contradiction).
Now, since (A.3) binds, Eq. (A.1) can be written as
maxx;I
1 þ g
1 þ i
  1   kfðd
nðx;kÞÞ
1 þ g
1 þ i
  
I þ W1 ðA:10Þ
and constraint (A.2) as
Ip
W1
1   rðx;kÞ
1þg
1þi
: ðA:20Þ
At the solution, the entrepreneur sets x such that the expression in brackets in
(A.10) is positive (this expression is positive for x ¼ 0; and therefore, it must be
positive at the solution) and therefore, he sets I as high as possible. That is,
constraint (A.2) binds, which means that the entrepreneur invests his entire wealth in
the project. Plugging the value of I into Eq. (A.10) and letting
Gðx;kÞ¼
1þg
1þi   1   kfðdnðx;kÞÞ
1þg
1þi
1   rðx;kÞ
1þg
1þi
;
the problem reduces to maxxGðx;kÞ: The ﬁrst-order condition of this problem,
G1ðxn;kÞ¼0; is Eq. (5). Finally, we show that the second-order condition for a
maximum hold. Letting
M ¼
1þg
1þi
1  
1þg
1þirðxn;kÞ
> 0;
G11ðxn;kÞ¼Mð ð1   kÞdn
1ðxn;kÞ ð 1   kÞxndn
11ðxn;kÞþr11ðxn;kÞGðxn;kÞÞ
G11ðx
n;kÞ¼ Mð1   kÞd
n
1 2  
f 0ðdÞf 000ðdÞ
ðf 00ðdÞÞ
2
  
Gðx
n;kÞ
 
þ 1  
f 0ðdÞf 000ðdÞ
ðf 00ðdÞÞ
2
    
o0;
where both parentheses are positive by assumption (d).
Assumption (d) guarantees that the problem has a maximum. Roughly speaking
this assumption guarantees that the marginal cost is increasing and the marginal
beneﬁt decreasing, a sufﬁcient condition for the solution of (5) to be a maximum.
The marginal cost is the increase in the expected ﬁne as a result of an increase x: This
increase is given by kf 0ðdnÞ dn
1: By assumption (d), dn
1 is relatively constant
throughout the ownership range. Also, at date 2, the entrepreneur equates the
A. Shleifer, D. Wolfenzon / Journal of Financial Economics 66 (2002) 3–27 21increase in the expected ﬁne due to a change in diversion, kf 0ðdnÞ; with the increase in
expected dividend savings ð1   kÞx; which is increasing in x: Therefore, the marginal
cost, kf 0ðdnÞ dn
1; is increasing in x:
The marginal beneﬁt is given by the higher-than-market return that the additional
funds raised provide. The additional revenue raised is given by r1ðx;kÞ¼½ 1  ð 1  
kÞdn þ½   xð1   kÞdn
1 : The ﬁrst bracket (quantity effect) is the price the market pays
for the additional unit sold. For high values of x; the market expects higher diversion
and hence pays a lower price for the additional unit sold. That is, the quantity effect
is decreasing in x: When an additional share is sold, the price declines since the
market expects more diversion. The second bracket (the price effect) is the negative
effect on revenue that the price decline has on all the units sold. Since by assumption
(d), dn
1 is relatively constant, the price decline is relatively constant. However, since at
higher levels of x; this price decline affects more units, the price effect is larger for
higher x: In sum, as x increases, the positive quantity effect decreases and the
negative price effect increases. Therefore, the additional revenue and hence the
marginal beneﬁt are decreasing in x: &
Lemma A.1. @½kfðdnðx;kÞÞ =@ko0:
Proof.
@
@k
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@
@k
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nð0;kÞÞ þ k
Z x
0
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1ðh;kÞ dh
  
¼
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Z x
0
hð1   kÞd
n
1ðh;kÞ dh
¼
Z x
0
h
@
@k
½ð1   kÞd
n
1ðh;kÞ dho0:
The second line follows from dnð0;kÞ¼0 (part (a) of Proposition 1), fð0Þ¼0
(assumption (a)), and by replacing f 0ðdnðh;kÞÞ from the ﬁrst-order condition in
Eq. (3). The last inequality follows from Proposition 2. &
Proof of Proposition 4. Part (a). Suppose g > i: Completely differentiating the ﬁrst-
order condition with respect to k leads to
@xn
@k
¼ 
G12ðxn;kÞ
G11ðxn;kÞ
¼ 
Mð x @
@k½ð1   kÞd1 þr12G þ r1G2Þ
G11
       
x¼xn
: ðA:4Þ
We need to show that the above expression is positive. By the second-order
condition, G11ðxn;kÞo0: As stated above, M > 0: The ﬁrst term in the numerator is
positive since, by Proposition 2, dn
12o0: The second term is the product of two
positive expressions. First, Gð0;kÞ > 0; and therefore, Gðxn;kÞ > 0: Second, r12 ¼
 @½ð1   kÞdn =@k   x@½ð1   kÞdn
1 =@k > 0 because the two terms in the ﬁrst bracket
decrease with k; and, by Proposition 2, dn
12o0: Finally, the third term in the
numerator is also the product of two positive numbers. r1ðxn;kÞ > 0 since, as we
explained in the text, the solution must in a region where the amount collected is
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kÞd2Þ > 0( d2o0 by part (c) of Proposition 1) and the second term is negative by
Lemma A.1.
Part (b) Each ﬁrm raises
RM ¼
rðxn;kÞ
1 þ i
ð1 þ gÞI
n ¼
rðxn;kÞ
1 þ i
ð1 þ gÞ
W1
1   rðxn;kÞ
1þg
1þi
:
This expression is increasing in rðxn;kÞ: And @rðxn;kÞ=@k ¼ r1ðxn;kÞð@xn=@kÞþ
r2ðxn;kÞ > 0; because (1) @xn=@k > 0 by part (a), (2) r1ðxn;kÞ > 0; and (3) r2ðxn;kÞ > 0
as explained in the proof of part (a). Since this is true for every ﬁrm j; it is also true
for the aggregate.
Part (c) E invests in assets the amount he raises in the market plus his entire
wealth. Since he raises more for higher k; the result follows. &
Proof of Proposition 5. By going public, E gets Gðxn;kÞW1 þ W1   c; and by staying
private, E gets ½ð1 þ gÞ=ð1 þ iÞ W1: By the envelope theorem, @Gðxn;kÞ=@k ¼
G2ðxn;kÞ: This expression is positive as explained in part (a) of the proof of
Proposition 4. Therefore, the difference between going public and staying private is
increasing in k: That is, in countries with good investor protection, the g required for
the gains of going public to outweigh the cost c is lower. &
Proof of Proposition 6. Let xnðkÞ be the equilibrium level of x for any ﬁrm j when the
country’s level of investor protection is k: By Eq. (3), the equilibrium level of
diversion solves f 0ðdnÞ¼½ ð 1   kÞ=k xnðkÞ: Since f 00 > 0; the higher the right-hand
side, the higher is the level of diversion. Therefore, diversion is decreasing in k if and
only if @½ð1   kÞxnðkÞ=k =@ko0: &
Proof of Proposition 7. As explained in Section 3, the supply of funds is independent
of the degree of investor protection. In addition, as explained in part (b) of the proof
of Proposition 4, for a given i; demand is higher in countries with good investor
protection. The result follows. &
Proof of Proposition 8. In an economy closed to capital ﬂows, the equilibrium level
of interest rate, ic; solves
X
jstg jpic
NWj ¼
X
jstg j>ic
NWj
1   rðx*j;kÞ
1þg j
1þic
  NWj
 !
;
where the left-hand side is the supply of funds (all entrepreneurs with projects with
productivity less than ic supply their entire wealth) and the right-hand side is the
demand for funds (for each ﬁrm set up, it is investment minus the entrepreneur’s
wealth). Since the optimal x*j is independent of the entrepreneur’s wealth (see
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independent of N: &
Proof of Proposition 9. The country we consider is small (so that whether it is open
or closed to capital markets does not affect the world interest rate) and has investor
protection of k: We consider the world as a country with investor protection of
kw > k: We let iw be the world interest rate and ic be the interest rate that prevails in
the country when it is closed to capital markets. By Proposition 7, iw > ic:
Consider an entrepreneur j with a project with productivity g j; with g j > iw > ic
(i.e., this entrepreneur sets up his ﬁrm both when the country is open and when it
restricts capital ﬂows). We let xw;j and xc;j be the optimal ownership concentration
when the country is open to capital ﬂows and when it is closed, respectively. Letting
m ¼ð 1 þ gÞ=ð1 þ iÞ and by completely differentiating the ﬁrst-order condition
G1ðxn; kÞ¼0 with respect to i; we obtain
@xn
@i
¼ 
@G1ðxn;kÞ
@i
G11ðxn;kÞ
¼ 
Mr1
1
1 rm½ð1   kfðdnÞÞð1   rmÞþrðm   1   mkfðdnÞÞ @m
@i
G11
       
x¼xn
o0:
This inequality follows because 1   rðxn;kÞm > 0 (we discussed this condition after
Proposition 3). In addition, since Gðxn;kÞ > 0; then m   1   mkfðdnÞ > 0; and this
last inequality implies that 1   kfðd*Þ > 0: Also, @m=@io0: The sign of all other
expressions were discussed in the above proofs. It follows from the above derivative
that xw;joxc;j:
The marginal increase in payoffs of an entrepreneur due to a change in investor
protection is given by
@
@k
fð1   xÞð1  ð 1   kÞd
nÞþð 1   kÞd
n   kfðd
nÞgð1 þ gÞI
n
¼  f xd
n þ fðd
nÞgð1 þ gÞI
n
where we have used the envelope theorem since the entrepreneur chooses dn
optimally after the change in investor protection. We show that this loss is larger
when the country is closed to capital ﬂows. First, xw;jdnðxw;j;kÞþ
fðdðxw;j;kÞÞoxc;jdnðxc;j;kÞþfðdðxc;j;kÞÞ since xw;joxc;j; dn
1 > 0; and f 0 > 0: In
addition, In; which is given by
I
n ¼ W1 1   rðx
n;kÞ
1 þ g
1 þ i
    
;
is higher in the closed economy. This follows from the fact that, at the solution,
rðx;kÞ is increasing in x;xw;joxc;j; and iw > ic:
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X
j:g jXic
fxc;jd
nðxc;j;kÞþfðd
nðxc;j;kÞÞgð1 þ gjÞIc;j
¼
X
j:g jXiw
fxc;jd
nðxc;j;kÞþfðd
nðxc;j;kÞÞgð1 þ gjÞIc;j
þ
X
j:iw>gjXic
fxc;jd
nðxc;j;kÞþfðd
nðxc;j;kÞÞgð1 þ gjÞIc;j
X
X
j:g jXiw
fxw;jd
nðxw;j;kÞþfðd
nðxw;j;kÞÞgð1 þ gjÞIw;j
where the ﬁrst expression is the aggregate loss of entrepreneurs setting up ﬁrms in a
country closed to capital ﬂows and the last expression is a similar expression for a
country that is open to capital ﬂows. The equality follows because iw > ic: The
inequality follows from the above discussion and the fact that losses are positive. &
Proof of Proposition 10. (1) From Eqs. (A.10) and (A.20), the entrepreneur’s problem
at date 1 is given by
maxx;I
1 þ g
1 þ i
  1   kfðd
nðx;kÞÞ
1 þ g
1 þ i
  
I þ W1 ðA:10Þ
subject to
Ip
W1
1   rðx;kÞ
1þg
1þi
: ðA:20Þ
An improvement in investor protection raises the payoff function for any given x
since, by Lemma A.1, @½kfðdnðx;kÞÞ =@ko0: In addition, an increase in investor
protection relaxes the constraint since r2ðx;kÞ > 0: Therefore, each entrepreneur that
sets up a ﬁrm is better off.
(2) Consider a country closed to capital ﬂows. The interest rate is initially ic and
rises to ic þ e when investor protection improves (e > 0 by Proposition 7). Consider
an entrepreneur with a project of productivity g ¼ ic þ e: We show that this
entrepreneur is strictly worse off from an improvement in investor protection. If
there is such an improvement, he is indifferent between setting up and keeping 100%
of its shares or supplying his funds to the market (by Proposition 3). His payoff is
then W1ð1 þ gÞ: If there is no improvement, the interest rate is ic: The entrepreneur
can always invest in his project, keep 100% of the equity, and obtain a payoff of
W1ð1 þ gÞ: However, by Proposition 3, since g > ic; keeping 100% of the equity is not
optimal. He can do better by setting up the ﬁrm and selling some positive fraction of
the equity. Therefore, his payoff in this scenario is higher than W1ð1 þ gÞ: &
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